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The BRICS and the Responsibility to Protect: Lessons from the Libyan 
and Syrian Crises 
Andrew Garwood-Gowers* 
ABSTRACT 
The emerging ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) principle presents a significant challenge 
to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) states’ traditional emphasis 
on a strict Westphalian understanding of state sovereignty and non-interference in 
domestic affairs. Despite formally endorsing R2P at the 2005 World Summit, each of the 
BRICS has, to varying degrees, retained misgivings about coercive measures under the 
doctrine’s third pillar. This paper examines how these rising powers engaged with R2P 
during the 2011–2012 Libyan and Syrian civilian protection crises. The central finding is 
that although all five states expressed similar concerns over NATO’s military campaign 
in Libya, they have been unable to maintain a common BRICS position on R2P in Syria. 
Instead, the BRICS have splintered into two sub-groups. The first, consisting of Russia 
and China, remains steadfastly opposed to any coercive measures against Syria. The 
second, comprising the democratic IBSA states (India, Brazil and South Africa) has 
displayed softer, more flexible stances towards proposed civilian protection measures in 
Syria, although these three states also remain cautious about the implementation of 
R2P’s coercive dimension. This paper identifies a number of factors which help to 
explain this split, arguing that the failure to maintain a cohesive BRICS position on R2P 
is unsurprising given the many internal differences and diverging national interests 
between the BRICS members. Overall, the BRICS’ ongoing resistance to intervention is 
unlikely to disappear quickly, indicating that further attempts to operationalize R2P’s 
third pillar may prove difficult. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the attitudes of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) states towards the emerging ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) 
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principle, focussing primarily on their engagement with R2P during the civilian 
protection crises in Libya and Syria from 2011 onwards.1 Within the BRICS 
group, the veto-holding permanent members of the Security Council, Russia and 
China already wield considerable institutional power on matters of international 
peace and security, including civilian protection and intervention. Outside the 
Security Council, the democratic states of India, Brazil and South Africa (known 
as IBSA) have emerged as leading regional powers with aspirations to play 
greater roles in the international system. Although the internal differences and 
diverging national interests of the five BRICS members raise questions about the 
bloc’s ability to articulate a common vision, moves to institutionalise the group 
are gathering pace.2 One foreign policy orientation shared by all five states has 
been traditional insistence on a strict, Westphalian interpretation of state 
sovereignty which emphasises the principle of non-intervention in domestic 
affairs. R2P’s emergence presents a significant challenge to this stance. The future 
success or failure of R2P as a new international norm guiding intervention for 
civilian protection purposes will depend, to a large extent, on how it is received by 
the BRICS.  
 
                                                 
1 When referring to R2P this paper uses the terms ‘principle’, ‘doctrine’ and ‘concept’ 
interchangeably. 
2 The BRICS have held an annual summit since 2009 and in 2011 formed the BRICS Forum, an 
‘independent international organization that works for a structured social, economic and 
environmentally sustainable BRICS bloc’. See BRICS Forum <http://www.bricsforum-org/brics-
Forum> accessed 11 January 2013. 
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As the Libyan uprising unfolded in early 2011 all five BRICS states held seats at 
the Security Council, providing a valuable opportunity to gauge their responses to 
international efforts to implement R2P. The Security Council’s timely and 
decisive response to the Libyan crisis initially raised hopes of a new era of 
international cooperation on civilian protection. Instead of opposing proposed 
military action in Libya, Russia, China, Brazil and India each abstained – while 
South Africa voted in favour – allowing Security Council resolution 1973 to pass. 
While supporters of R2P immediately hailed this historic resolution as a 
significant step towards the consolidation of R2P’s status as a new international 
norm, disagreements soon emerged between Western and non-Western states over 
the scope of military action permitted by the resolution.3 Long-standing fears 
among the BRICS that R2P could be used as a pretext for regime change returned 
to the fore as the legitimacy of NATO’s campaign in Libya was called into 
question by these states. This backlash against R2P has been evident in the 
Security Council’s deadlock over the ongoing crisis in Syria, with Russia and 
China vetoing three Western-sponsored draft resolutions. 
 
This paper contains four parts. The first outlines the concept of R2P and traces its 
evolution over the past 11 years. Part two briefly assesses the BRICS states’ 
attitudes towards R2P prior to Libya. In part three their positions on the Libyan 
                                                 
3 Thomas G. Weiss, ‘RtoP Alive and Well after Libya’ (2011) 25 Ethics and International Affairs 
287, 287. 
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intervention are dissected. The final part then analyses the BRICS’ stances 
towards proposed civilian protection measures in Syria. 
 
The central finding of this paper is that although all five BRICS share misgivings 
over R2P’s third pillar and were critical of NATO’s military action in Libya, this 
has not translated into a common BRICS position on Syria. Instead, the bloc has 
splintered into two sub-groups. On one side, Russia and China remain steadfastly 
opposed to any coercive measures – whether forcible or non-forcible – against 
Syria. On the other, the democratic IBSA states have displayed softer, more 
flexible stances towards proposed international responses, though they too remain 
cautious about R2P’s coercive dimension. This paper identifies a number of 
factors which help to explain this split, arguing that the inability to maintain a 
cohesive BRICS position on R2P is unsurprising given the many internal 
differences and diverging national interests between the BRICS members. 
Overall, each of the BRICS retains misgivings over R2P, suggesting that further 
attempts to operationalize R2P’s third pillar are likely to encounter significant 
resistance from these emerging powers.  
 
R2P AND ITS EVOLUTION 
 
R2P as a Concept 
The concept of R2P evolved out of dismay at the international community’s 
failure to prevent mass atrocities in Rwanda and elsewhere in the 1990s. It 
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represents a re-conceptualization of the relationship between state sovereignty and 
human rights, in which sovereignty is viewed ‘not as an absolute term of authority 
but as a kind of responsibility’.4 In the original 2001 International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report R2P was conceived as having 
three elements: the responsibility to prevent a population from suffering serious 
harm; the responsibility to react if such harm occurs; and the responsibility to 
rebuild after an intervention. 5 While the primary responsibility to protect lay with 
the host state, if that state perpetrated ‘serious harm’ to a population, or was 
unwilling or unable to stop such violence, the international community assumed a 
responsibility to protect.6 ‘Serious harm’ was defined as actual or imminent ‘large 
scale loss of life’ or ‘large scale ethnic cleansing’.7 Military intervention for 
civilian protection purposes was envisaged as an exceptional measure which 
should be considered in the light of six criteria: just cause; right intention; last 
resort; right authority; proportional means; and reasonable prospects of success.8). 
Although the ICISS designated the Security Council as the most appropriate body 
for authorizing military action for human protection purposes, it suggested that the 
General Assembly and regional or sub-regional organizations might provide 
                                                 
4 Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the 
Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press 2006) 251. 
5 ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty), The Responsibility to 
Protect (International Development Research Centre 2001) xi. 
6 ibid.  
7 ibid xii. 
8 ibid. 
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alternative mechanisms for authorizing force if the Security Council was 
deadlocked.9 
 
In its current form, as distinct from the earlier 2001 conception, R2P consists of 
three mutually-reinforcing pillars derived from the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document,10 and subsequently outlined in the UN Secretary-General’s 2009 
report.11 The first is that states have an obligation to protect their populations from 
mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity).12 The second pillar stipulates that the international community should 
assist states in fulfilling their pillar one obligations. Where states are ‘manifestly 
failing’ to protect their populations, the third pillar provides that the international 
community has a responsibility to respond in a ‘timely and decisive manner’.13 
Action under the third pillar can encompass non-coercive means such as 
diplomacy and humanitarian assistance, and, coercive measures like sanctions or, 
as a last resort, the use of military force.  
 
                                                 
9 ibid xiii. 
10 UNGA ‘World Summit Outcome Document’ UNGA Res 60/1 (2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1. 
11 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 
UN Doc A/63/677. 
12 For discussion of the legal definitions of the four crimes, see David Scheffer, ‘Atrocity Crimes 
Framing the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 40 Case Western Journal of International Law 111. 
13 UNGA (n 10) para. 139. 
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It is generally recognized that R2P is based on existing principles of international 
law and does not add anything new in the way of legal duties.14 R2P can be seen 
primarily as a political or moral commitment to implementing established (pillar 
one and two) duties created in treaty law and customary international law.15 
Contrary to the original ICISS report, the current notion of military action under 
R2P’s third pillar is permitted only in accordance with existing UN Charter 
Chapter VII procedures governing the Security Council’s authorization of the use 
of force. 
  
R2P’s Evolution since 2001 
In historical terms, R2P’s reception into the international system has been rapid, 
though aspects of the concept remain contested. The most controversial dimension 
has been the third pillar, particularly the use of military force. From the outset, 
                                                 
14 See, for example, the assessments of Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘The New Politics 
of Protection? Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’ 87 International Affairs 825 
and Carsten Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (2007) 
101 American Journal of International Law 99. Note that Anne Orford, ‘From Promise to 
Practice? The Legal Significance of the Responsibility to Protect Concept’ (2011) 3 Global 
Responsibility to Protect 400, 421 argues that R2P ‘should be understood as normative in the 
former sense of providing legal authorisation for certain kinds of activities’. However, this is a 
claim that R2P confers legal powers, rather an assertion that it imposes legal duties.  
15 For example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(adopted 9 December 1948 UNGA Res 260 (III), entered into force 12 January 1951) has been 
interpreted by the International Court of Justice as imposing a legal duty on a state to take peaceful 
measures to prevent genocide in circumstances where that state has relevant information and 
capacity to take such steps. See Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) 
(Merits) [2007] ICJ Rep 43. 
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many non-Western states, including the BRICS, were suspicious of this 
component, fearing that it might be used as a tool of Western imperialism.16 
Conscious of the need to assuage such fears and build support for R2P, UN 
officials adopted a diplomatic strategy of emphasizing the more palatable 
elements of the concept, namely prevention and state assistance.17 This approach, 
coupled with R2P sceptics’ ongoing resistance to the military dimension of R2P, 
led to several significant modifications of the original ICISS conception of R2P. 
First, the military force dimension was placed exclusively under Security Council 
control, closing off the ICISS’s suggestion that alternative authorization 
mechanisms might be utilized if the Security Council was unable to agree. 
Second, the ICISS’s criteria for determining the appropriateness of military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes were removed. Third, the types of violence 
covered by R2P were limited to the four mass atrocity crimes, rather than the 
previous, less precise category of ‘large scale loss of life’. Finally, the threshold 
triggering the international community’s responsibility was raised from a host 
                                                 
16 For example, in ICISS Roundtable discussions in June 2001, China stated that ‘[i]t is clear that 
certain Western powers have played with noble principles to serve their own hegemonic interests’. 
See ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty), The Responsibility 
to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background – Supplementary Volume to the Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (International Development 
Research Centre 2001). 
17 On R2P’s preventive dimension, see Andrew Garwood-Gowers, ‘Enhancing Protection of 
Civilians through Responsibility to Protect Preventive Action’, in Angus Francis, Vesselin 
Popovski and Charles Sampford (eds), Norms of Protection: Responsibility to Protect, Protection 
of Civilians in Armed Conflict and Their Interaction (United Nations University Press 2012). 
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state being ‘unwilling or unable’ to halt violence, to the more onerous standard of 
‘manifestly failing’. As a result of these changes, the conception of R2P that was 
unanimously adopted by UN member states at the 2005 World Summit was a 
weaker, less concrete version of the concept initially formulated by the ICISS.18 
Under ‘R2P-lite’, as Weiss 19 labelled it, military intervention remained an option 
in exceptional circumstances, but there was now no guidance as to when the 
Security Council should authorize such action. Since 2005 discussion of R2P 
within the UN system has continued to focus on the less controversial aspects of 
preventive action and state capacity-building under the first and second pillars. 
Despite lingering resistance to R2P from some states, this cautious approach 
eventually led to consensus within the Security Council on resolution 1674,20 
which ‘reaffirmed’ the World Summit’s commitments on R2P. The first mention 
of R2P in relation to a specific crisis occurred subsequently in 2006 with Security 
Council resolution 170621 on the situation in Darfur. In 2008, the preventive 
component of the concept played a significant role in framing the international 
community’s response to post-election violence in Kenya, while a further 
                                                 
18 UNGA (n 10) para. 139. For discussion of R2P’s shift across the normative continuum, see 
Joachim Prantl and Ryoko Nakano, ‘Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan 
Implement the Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) 25 International Relations 204. 
19 Weiss (n 3) 750. 
20 UNSC Res 1674 (28 April 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1674. 
21 UNSC Res 1706 (31 August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1706. 
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resolution in 2009 provided additional endorsement of R2P in general terms.22 
However, throughout this period, ongoing resistance to implementing R2P meant 
that specific references to the principle were not included in further Security 
Council resolutions on other crises. Instead, attention shifted from the Security 
Council to the General Assembly, where broader discussion of R2P could be 
undertaken by all UN member states. This culminated in the 2009 General 
Assembly debate23, in which states overwhelmingly supported Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-Moon’s report24 (UNSG 2009) outlining the three pillars of R2P. 
Although this outcome appeared to vindicate the Secretary General’s diplomatic 
approach, his strategy of emphasizing the preventive aspects of R2P meant that 
contentious issues surrounding coercive intervention remained unresolved.25 This 
indeterminacy in pillar three enabled virtually all states – including the BRICS – 
to pledge support for R2P at a rhetorical level, but it also papered over significant 
differences between Western and non-Western states’ interpretations of how 
R2P’s coercive dimension should be operationalized.  
                                                 
22 UNSC Res 1894 (11 November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1894. On the Kenyan situation, see 
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect ‘The Responsibility to Protect and Kenya: Past 
Successes and Current Challenges’ (13 August 2010) 
<http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/The_Responsibility_to_Protect_and_Kenya_Past_Successes_an
d_Current_Challenges%281%29.pdf> accessed 17 November 2012.  
23 UN Doc A/63/PV.97 (2009); UN Doc A/63/PV.98 (2009); UN Doc A/63/PV.99 (2009); UN 
Doc A/63/PV.100 (2009); UN Doc A/63/PV.101 (2009). 
24 UNGA (n 11). 
 
25 For criticism of the Secretary-General’s diplomatic strategy, see Jennifer Welsh, ‘Civilian 
Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP’ (2011) 25 Ethics and 
International Affairs 255. 
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THE BRICS AND R2P PRIOR TO THE LIBYAN CRISIS 
 
Each of the five BRICS states has traditionally espoused a strict Westphalian 
interpretation of state sovereignty which emphasises the principle of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of other states. This has been reflected in 
opposition to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and a general suspicion of 
Western-led military campaigns. R2P’s potential to lead to coercive intervention 
has, therefore, posed a major challenge to the BRICS’ historical stances on 
sovereignty and non-interference. This section briefly outlines each state’s 
position on R2P between 2001 and 2011. 
 
China 
 
Prior to the Libyan crisis China’s engagement with R2P had passed through two 
broad phases.26 The first involved strong resistance to the original 2001 ICISS 
concept. China was deeply suspicious of the principle of R2P, fearing that 
Western powers would play with ‘noble principles to serve their own hegemonic 
interests’. 27 Another major concern was the ICISS suggestion that military action 
for humanitarian purposes could be authorised by the General Assembly or 
                                                 
26 For more on China’s attitude towards R2P see Andrew Garwood-Gowers, ‘China and R2P: The 
Implications of the Libyan Intervention’ (2012) 2 Asian Journal of International Law 375; 
Rosemary Foot, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and its Evolution: Beijing’s Influence on Norm 
Creation in Humanitarian Areas’ (2011) 6 St Antony’s International Review 47. 
27 ICISS (n 16) 392. 
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regional organisations if the Security Council was deadlocked. For China (and 
Russia) this was unacceptable because it would mean the two veto-holding 
permanent members were deprived of their ability to block international action. 
Insistence by China and other states that the Security Council retain exclusive 
control over R2P’s military dimension led to such a provision being included in 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome document. This allowed China to endorse R2P 
in that document but did not assuage Beijing’s concerns about the principle. 
 
The second phase of Beijing’s relationship with R2P – from 2005 till 2011 – 
featured cautious endorsement of a conservative interpretation of the concept, 
tempered by resistance to implementing the new doctrine in specific cases. In 
official statements Beijing was careful to emphasise R2P’s preventive and state 
assistance dimensions, while downplaying the potential for non-consensual 
coercive intervention. This apparent softening of Chinese attitudes towards R2P 
did not, however, translate into support for international action in country-specific 
cases of human rights abuses. China abstained from resolution 170628 on Darfur, 
and vetoed proposed sanctions against Myanmar 29 and Zimbabwe.30. Overall, 
during this second phase Beijing remained deeply uncomfortable with R2P’s third 
                                                 
28 UNSC Res 1706 (n 21). 
29 UN Doc S/PV.5619, 2007.  
30 UN Doc S/PV.5933, 2008. 
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pillar. Although China did not openly attack the principle, its continuing suspicion 
meant it has generally been classified as an R2P sceptic or ‘rejectionist’.31. 
 
Russia 
 
When R2P was first conceived in 2001 Russia, the other permanent member of 
the Security Council among the BRICS, expressed similar concerns to China. 
These included fears that the principle could be used as a pretext for ulterior 
motives, and that intervention authorised by bodies other than the Security 
Council would undermine Russia’s institutional power.32 In addition, Moscow’s 
cautious approach to R2P saw it emphasise respect for state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Russia also argued that there was no need for a new doctrine 
because existing UN Charter Chapter VII procedures already provided the 
Security Council with adequate authority to formulate responses to humanitarian 
crises.33  
 
Modifications to the original ICISS concept enabled Russia to endorse the lighter 
version of R2P contained in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. 
                                                 
31 Jonas Claes, ‘Protecting Civilians from Mass Atrocities: Meeting the Challenge of R2P 
Rejectionism’ (2012) 4 Global Responsibility to Protect 67, 71. 
32 ICISS (n 16). 
33 ICR2P (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect), ‘State-by-State Positions on 
the Responsibility to Protect’ 
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Chart_R2P_11August.pdf> accessed 17 November 
2012. 
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However, since then Moscow has stressed the primacy of the first and second 
pillars, while insisting that any coercive intervention under R2P’s third pillar 
should be limited to exceptional circumstances. In 2008 Moscow’s disingenuous 
attempt to justify its military intervention in Georgia by reference to R2P was 
dismissed as a misapplication of the doctrine.34 Aside from its own invocation of 
R2P in relation to Georgia, Russia showed little appetite for implementing R2P in 
country-specific situations, as evidenced by its vetoes on Myanmar and 
Zimbabwe. In general, Moscow’s approach to R2P between 2005 and 2011 was 
similar to that of Beijing; it avoided explicit criticism of R2P as a concept, but 
sought to slow the normative development and implementation of the principle. 
For these reasons, Russia has also generally been regarded as an R2P sceptic or 
‘rejectionist’.35 
 
India 
 
Like China and Russia, India’s initial reaction to R2P in 2001 was one of deep 
suspicion.36 Its post-colonial opposition to intervention and historical mistrust of 
Western motives meant that New Delhi was highly sceptical about the doctrine 
                                                 
34 Gareth Evans, ‘Russia, Georgia and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 1 Amsterdam Law 
Forum 25. 
35 Claes (n 31) 71. 
 
36 For detailed consideration of India’s stance on R2P see Ian Hall, ‘Tilting at Windmills? The 
Indian Debate over the Responsibility to Protect after UNSC 1973' (2013) 5 Global Responsibility 
to Protect 84. 
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proposed by the ICISS. To India, R2P was a smokescreen for Western powers to 
pursue their own national interests. New Delhi’s opposition to R2P persisted up to 
the 2005 World Summit, where it attempted to derail the international 
community’s endorsement of the principle.37 Although India ultimately relented 
and allowed the inclusion of R2P in the final Outcome Document, concerns 
persisted. 
 
From 2005 onwards India cautiously affirmed R2P – primarily in terms of pillars 
one and two – while continuing to express reservations about pillar three. At the 
2009 General Assembly dialogue on R2P, India again warned of the doctrine’s 
potential for misuse, stating bluntly that the ‘responsibility to protect should in no 
way provide a pretext for humanitarian intervention or unilateral action’.38 India’s 
overall position towards R2P prior to the Libya crisis was ambivalent: it accepted 
that the primary responsibility to protect lay with states, but retained serious 
misgivings about the coercive dimension of the principle.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (Polity 
2009). 
38 Permanent Mission to the UN (India), Statement by Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri at the 
General Assembly Plenary Meeting on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (24 July 2009) 
<www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/India_ENG.pdf> accessed 19 November 2012. 
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Brazil  
 
Brazil’s position on R2P between 2001 and 2011 gradually evolved from initial 
rejection to cautious acceptance of most aspects of the concept.39 Given its 
traditional foreign policy emphasis on state sovereignty and non-use of force it 
was unsurprising that Brazil’s first response was to dismiss R2P as humanitarian 
intervention dressed up in ‘new clothes’.40 However, in the period leading up to 
the 2005 World Summit Brazil began to engage more constructively with R2P, 
and its language gradually softened. Its shifting stance on intervention and use of 
force was evident in Brazil’s historic decision to play a leading role in the 2004 
UN peace-keeping mission in Haiti. This was linked to recognition that if Brazil 
aspired to play a greater role – both regionally and globally – it would need to 
adapt its traditional foreign policy approach to reflect the responsibilities that 
attach to leading power status. 
 
Following the 2005 World Summit Brazil’s engagement with R2P gathered pace, 
though it stopped short of formally accepting the concept as a new norm. In fact, 
at the 2009 General Assembly dialogue Brazil stated that R2P ‘is not a principle 
proper, much less a novel legal prescription’, but rather a ‘powerful political call 
for all States to abide by legal obligations already set forth in the Charter... and 
                                                 
39 For detailed consideration of Brazil’s position towards R2P see Kai Kenkel, ‘Brazil and R2P: 
Does Taking Responsibility Mean Using Force?’ (2012) 4 Global Responsibility to Protect 5. 
40 ibid 15. 
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other instruments’.41 Unsurprisingly, like the other BRICS, Brazil chose to 
emphasise the prevention and state capacity building aspects of R2P, while 
maintaining that the third pillar was ‘subsidiary’ and ‘a truly exceptional course of 
action’(ibid). Prior to the Libyan crisis Brazil’s overall position towards R2P 
remained equivocal: it was comfortable with some aspects of the concept but 
concerned about the risks associated with the coercive dimension. 
 
South Africa 
 
South Africa, the newest BRICS member, was the most receptive to R2P in the 
period prior to the Libyan crisis. From 1994 onwards post-apartheid South Africa 
played a significant role in crafting the African Union’s own version of R2P, 
which preceded the ICISS’s 2001 conception.42 Successive South African leaders 
actively promoted the continent’s shift ‘from non-interference to non-
indifference’, indicating a willingness to depart from a traditional strict 
interpretation of state sovereignty. Yet despite its activism at a continental level, 
South Africa did not outline a clear, explicit policy position towards R2P at the 
                                                 
41 Permanent Mission to the UN (Brazil), ‘Letter Dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent 
Representative of Brazil to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General – 
Responsibility While Protecting: Elements for the Development and Promotion of a Concept’, UN 
Doc A/66/551-S/2011/701 (9 November 2011) 2. 
42 For analysis of South Africa’s stance on R2P see Chris Landsberg, ‘Pax South Africana and the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 436. African Union 
Constitutive Act, article 4(h) affirms ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State 
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity’. 
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global level.43 The picture that emerged from South African statements and 
practices was of a generally supportive stance towards R2P, coupled with an 
emphasis on responding to country-specific situations through negotiation and 
political processes, as opposed to applying punitive or coercive measures.44 
 
South Africa’s preference for implementing R2P through diplomacy and other 
non-coercive tools was a feature of its time on the Security Council in 2007–2008. 
In a number of situations before the Council – including Zimbabwe, Sudan, 
Somalia and Myanmar – South Africa opposed Western proposals to impose 
sanctions and other punitive measures, arguing instead that political processes and 
negotiation were more appropriate means of promoting R2P.45 This strategy was 
part of a broader South African policy of conflict-resolution based upon engaging 
with, and promoting dialogue between, protagonists. On the whole prior to Libya, 
South Africa promoted R2P as a concept, but was wary of attempts to implement 
it using coercive measures. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Landsberg (n 42). 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid. 
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THE BRICS AND R2P IN LIBYA 
 
R2P played a central role in framing the international community’s response to 
the situation that developed in Libya in February 2011.46 This was reflected in the 
language used by the Security Council throughout the crisis. First, following the 
Gaddafi regime’s initial violent crackdown on protesters, the Security Council 
issued a statement in which it explicitly ‘called on the Government of Libya to 
meet its responsibility to protect its population’.47 Second, on 26 February 2011, 
the Council unanimously adopted resolution 197048 under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, again expressly referring to R2P by ‘recalling the Libyan authorities’ 
responsibility to protect its population’. Acting in accordance with Article 41 of 
the Charter, this resolution imposed an arms embargo and other restrictions on 
travel and Libyan assets, and referred the situation to the International Criminal 
Court. Finally, on 17 March 2011, the Security Council passed resolution 1973,49 
with ten affirmative votes (including South Africa’s) and abstentions from China, 
Russia, Brazil, India, and Germany. It established a no-fly zone and authorized 
member states to take ‘all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under threat of attack’ while ‘excluding a foreign occupation 
                                                 
46 For a detailed account of events leading up to NATO’s military intervention in Libya, see Paul 
D. Williams, ‘Briefing: The Road to Humanitarian War in Libya’ (2011) 3 Global Responsibility 
to Protect 248. 
47 UNSC ‘Security Council Press Statement on Libya’ (22 February 2011) UN Doc SC/10180. 
48 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970. 
49 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973. 
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force of any form on any part of Libyan territory’.50 This was the first time the 
Security Council had authorised the use of force for civilian protection purposes 
against the wishes of a host state. Once again, R2P was explicitly mentioned: 
resolution 1973 reiterated ‘the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect 
the Libyan population’.51 Shortly after the passage of the resolution, a coalition of 
states under NATO control began military action against Libyan targets. 
 
At first glance, the passage of resolution 1973 suggested a new consensus among 
Security Council members on the need for decisive international responses to 
humanitarian crises. However, closer examination reveals that a highly unusual, 
perhaps exceptional, confluence of factors produced a ‘perfect storm’ in relation 
to the implementation of R2P in Libya.52 Three crucial determinants were the 
clarity and immediacy of the threat to civilians, Gaddafi’s international isolation 
and rapid fragmentation of his regime, and the presence of regional consensus on 
the need for international intervention.53 The combined effect of these 
considerations was that the BRICS, who retained misgivings about using force in 
Libya, found themselves in a difficult position. Voting against resolution 1973 in 
the face of mass atrocity crimes would have led to serious criticism and damaged 
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their international reputations.54 Confronted with this prospect, China, Russia, 
Brazil and India abstained, while South Africa voted in favour. 
 
Table 1 – BRICS’ Votes in the Security Council (SC) on Libya 
 
SC Res 1970 (26 Feb 2011)  SC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) 
China                             Yes  Abstain 
Russia                            Yes  Abstain 
India                              Yes  Abstain 
Brazil                             Yes  Abstain 
South Africa                 Yes  Yes 
 
 
Despite allowing resolution 1973 to pass each of the BRICS retained serious 
misgivings about the implementation of R2P’s third pillar in the Libyan situation. 
These concerns emerged in two stages. First, there were statements made in the 
Security Council immediately after the vote, and later the BRICS were highly 
critical of the way in which NATO’s military campaign in Libya was carried out.  
 
Following the Security Council vote on resolution 1973 each of the BRICS 
expressed concerns over the text of the resolution. China stated it had ‘serious 
difficulty with parts of the resolution’ and its preference was to resolve ‘the 
current crisis… through peaceful means’.55 Russia regretted the fact that it had 
received no answers to its questions about ‘how the no-fly zone would be 
enforced, what the rules of engagement would be and what limits on the use of 
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force there would be’.56 The scope of the mandate in resolution 1973 was also a 
concern for India, which noted the lack of ‘clarity about details of enforcement 
measures… and how these measures will exactly be carried out’.57 The Brazilian 
representative in the Security Council was of the view that ‘the text of resolution 
1973 (2011) contemplates measures that go far beyond that call [for a no-fly 
zone]’. 58 Even South Africa, which initially agreed to join Brazil and India in 
abstaining but ultimately decided to vote in favour, appeared somewhat 
uncomfortable with the resolution. It warned against ‘unilateral military 
intervention under the pretext of protecting civilians’ and expressed ‘hope that 
this resolution will be implemented in full respect for both its letter and spirit’.59  
 
The similarities in the BRICS’ positions and statements on resolution 1973 were 
not coincidental; officials have confirmed that bloc members consulted each other 
prior to the vote.60 First the IBSA states each agreed to abstain, and then IBSA 
consulted with China and Russia and found they could coordinate their 
abstentions.61 However, at the last minute South Africa changed its position and 
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decided to vote in favour. This shift was prompted by the positions taken by the 
other African members of the Security Council, Nigeria and Gabon, which were 
in favour of the resolution. South Africa made a strategic decision that aligning 
itself with regional states was of greater importance than adopting a common 
IBSA or BRICS stance. Despite this late decision to support resolution 1973, 
South Africa’s statements in the Security Council indicate that it, too, retained 
doubts about the resolution. 
 
The second stage of the BRICS’ concerns about R2P emerged soon after military 
action in Libya began. Criticism of NATO’s campaign in Libya followed three 
main lines. The first was the BRICS’ accusation that Western powers had 
exceeded the scope of the mandate in resolution 1973 by arming rebels and 
attacking a broad range of targets beyond those necessary for the protection of 
civilians. Russia warned that ‘[a]ny act going beyond the mandate established by 
that resolution in any way or any disproportionate use of force is unacceptable’.62 
China stated that ‘[w]e are not in favour of any arbitrary interpretation of the 
Council’s resolutions or of any actions going beyond those mandated’.63 South 
Africa also questioned ‘whether the actions of the implementing states have been 
consistent with the letter and spirit of [the arms embargo imposed by] resolution 
1970 (2011)’.64 Closely linked to the first line of criticism was the broader claim 
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that R2P and civilian protection had been used by the West as a pretext for the 
strategic goal of removing the Gaddafi regime.65 While this concern over regime 
change was expressed most strongly by Russia, it was also a feature of the other 
BRICS’ criticisms of NATO’s campaign throughout 2011, and continues to pose a 
major challenge to the legitimacy of R2P.66 The third basis for criticism of 
NATO’s campaign in Libya was the primacy given to the use of military force 
and the potential for forcible responses to do more harm than good. Russia, in 
particular, specifically drew a link between the West’s military intervention and 
the outbreak of ‘full-fledged civil war, the humanitarian, social, economic and 
military consequences of which transcend Libyan borders’.67 The other BRICS 
also indicated a preference for political, rather than military, solutions to the 
Libyan conflict.68  
  
Overall, each of the BRICS adopted similar stances towards R2P in the Libyan 
crisis. With the exception of South Africa’s late decision to vote in favour of 
resolution 1973, the bloc was able to coordinate its voting strategies within the 
Security Council. In addition, all five rising powers pursued similar lines of 
criticism towards NATO’s military campaign, highlighting a number of shared 
concerns about the implementation of R2P’s third pillar. Speaking in June 2011, 
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India’s ambassador to the UN described the political impact of the Libyan 
intervention: ‘Libya has given R2P a bad name’.69 This assessment was echoed by 
Kofi Annan, who recently admitted that ‘[h]onestly, the way the “responsibility to 
protect” was used in Libya caused a problem for the concept’.70 These BRICS’ 
concerns over R2P in the aftermath of the Libyan experience provided an 
important contextual background to the Security Council’s deliberations over 
civilian protection measures in Syria. 
 
THE BRICS AND R2P IN SYRIA 
 
In marked contrast to its swift, decisive action on Libya, the Security Council has 
been unable to reach consensus on any substantial measures to stem the violence 
in Syria.71 Since the Syrian uprising began in March 2011 the only action Council 
members have been able to agree on was the April 2012 deployment of an 
unarmed observer mission, which proved ineffective. Three separate Western-
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sponsored draft resolutions72 proposing measures against the Assad regime have 
been vetoed by Russia and China in the Security Council, prompting angry 
diplomatic exchanges between Council members.  
  
Throughout the crisis disagreements have centred on two key issues: first, how to 
interpret events in Syria, and second, how to respond to the violence.73 In the 
early stages of the conflict Western powers characterised the situation as brutal 
repression of pro-democracy protesters by the Assad regime, whereas the BRICS 
– particularly Russia and China – emphasised that violence was occurring in the 
context of a legitimate government response to attacks on state infrastructure by 
armed opposition groups (ibid). These divergent perspectives on the factual 
situation on the ground have undermined attempts to reach agreement on 
appropriate responses. While Western states – and subsequently the Arab League 
– have pushed for President Assad to step aside, Russia and China have strongly 
opposed all external attempts to impose regime change.  
 
The BRICS’ positions on Syria must be assessed in two separate phases. The first 
– from April to November 2011 – saw all five members assume a unified stance 
in opposition to proposed Western responses to the crisis. However, in the second 
phase – from December 2011 onwards – the IBSA states shifted their positions, 
gradually becoming more receptive to proposed civilian protection measures. 
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Instead of continuing to act as a bloc the BRICS split into two sub-groups: on one 
side, Russia and China remained strongly aligned in steadfast opposition to any 
coercive measures against Syria, while on the other, the IBSA states adopted more 
flexible, though not always identical, stances towards proposed international 
action. 
Table 2 – BRICS’ Votes in Security Council (SC) and General Assembly (GA) 
on Syria 
  
  1st vetoed 
draft SC Res  
(4 Oct 2011) 
2nd vetoed 
draft SC Res  
(4 Feb 2012) 
GA Res 
66/253 A 
(16 Feb 
2012) 
3rd vetoed draft  
SC Res  
(19 July 2012)  
Syria GA Res 
66/253 B 
(3 August 
2012) 
China  No  No  No  No  No 
Russia  No  No  No  No  No 
India  Abs.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Abs. 
Brazil*  Abs.  N/A  Yes  N/A  Yes 
South 
Africa 
Abs.  Yes  Yes  Abs.  Yes 
 
*Brazil was no longer a Security Council member in 2012. 
 
The initial period of unity between the BRICS is reflected in the response to the 
first Western-sponsored draft resolution put to a vote in the Security Council on 4 
October 2011. Although the text was relatively weak – it merely condemned the 
violence and warned of possible sanctions if civilian casualties continued – it 
drew strong resistance from all five BRICS.74 China and Russia vetoed the draft, 
while IBSA decided to abstain in order to avoid confrontation with the West.75 
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Despite abstaining, the IBSA states were clearly aligned with Russia and China in 
opposition to the UK drafted text. Statements in the Security Council highlighted 
a number of BRICS’ concerns, including the text’s failure to address violence 
emanating from opposition groups, suspicions that the West was seeking to 
initiate regime change, and fears that threatening sanctions would exacerbate 
tensions in Syria.76 The strongest language came from Russia, which stated that 
‘[t]he international community is alarmed by statements that compliance with 
Security Council resolutions on Libya in the NATO interpretation is a model for 
the future actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility to protect’.77 
Moscow warned that it ‘is easy to see that today’s “Unified Protector” model 
[NATO’s Libyan operation] could happen in Syria’ and that ‘[t]hese types of 
models should be excluded from global practices once and for all’.78 
 
As violence in Syria worsened the IBSA states gradually softened their resistance 
to international attempts to resolve the crisis. A second Western-led draft 
resolution, which endorsed the League of Arab States’ (LAS) plan for President 
Assad to step aside in a ‘Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural 
political system’, was put to a vote in the Security Council on 4 February 2012.79 
To assuage the BRICS’ concerns about interpretation of Security Council 
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mandates, the text explicitly ruled out any military action under article 42 of the 
UN Charter. This time India and South Africa distinguished themselves from 
Russia and China by voting in favour of the proposal. Russia and China again cast 
double vetoes to block the resolution, arguing that the text was unbalanced. 
Beijing stressed that ‘pressuring the Syrian Government … will not help resolve 
the Syrian issue’.80 On 16 February 2012 the UN General Assembly adopted a 
non-binding resolution containing similar wording to the vetoed Security Council 
draft.81 In the General Assembly the BRICS again split into two sub-groups: 
Russia and China voted against the resolution, while the IBSA states supported it. 
Two important factors contributing to IBSA’s shifting position were the 
worsening situation on the ground in Syria, plus regional support for international 
measures, namely the Arab League’s plan for Assad to depart.82 These 
considerations were not, however, sufficient to alter the firm stances taken by 
Russia and China. 
 
Following the second double veto, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was 
appointed Joint Special Envoy to Syria by the UN and the LAS. Hopes of a 
resolution to the crisis were raised briefly when Annan’s Six-Point Plan was 
agreed to by the Syrian government and subsequently endorsed by the Security 
Council, which authorised the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to 
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monitor compliance with the plan. However, this mission, described by one 
commentator as a ‘lowest common-denominator response’, was later suspended 
due to the continuing violence.83 
 
After that brief period of consensus within the Security Council, divisions 
between Western powers and Russia and China re-emerged once it became clear 
that the Six-Point Plan was not being implemented. A third Western-sponsored 
draft resolution was put to a vote in the Security Council on 19 July 2012. This 
proposal would have extended UNSMIS for another 45 days and threatened 
sanctions against the Syrian authorities if they failed to comply with Kofi Annan’s 
Six-Point Plan.84. Once more, Russia and China vetoed the draft, complaining that 
it failed to adequately address violence emanating from Syrian opposition groups, 
did not explicitly rule out military intervention, and would not help to resolve the 
situation on the ground.85 Again, India and South Africa adopted more 
accommodating stances, with the former voting in favour of the draft, while the 
latter abstained. South Africa’s reasons for abstaining included concern that the 
text was unbalanced because it ‘preferred one side over the other’, which could 
lead to ‘polarization of the conflict’.86 
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The BRICS again split into two sub-groups when a non-binding General 
Assembly resolution was passed on 3 August 2012. Here, an overwhelming 
majority of states supported a Saudi-drafted text that condemned the Syrian 
government’s continued use of heavy weapons in civilian areas and called for a 
ceasefire, while ‘deploring the failure of the Security Council to agree on 
measures’.87 However, Russia and China were among a small number of states 
that voted against the resolution. Their objections centred on the unbalanced 
nature of the text and the fact that outside ‘measures aimed at forcing regime 
change’ would not help to resolve the situation.88 The IBSA states again 
distinguished themselves from China and Russia, though they did not adopt 
identical voting positions. While Brazil and South Africa voted in favour of the 
resolution, India abstained. New Delhi was concerned that the text endorsed an 
earlier Arab League call for President Assad to step down.89 These differences 
between the IBSA states illustrate the flexibility and unpredictability of their 
voting positions. 
 
The diverging positions of Russia and China, on one side, and the IBSA states on 
the other, can be explained by a number of factors. First, differences between the 
BRICS’ national interests have been relevant. Russia’s strong opposition to 
intervention has been influenced by its strategic interests in Syria, including a 
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naval base at Tartus and extensive arms contracts with the Assad government.90 
China’s general strategy of aligning itself with Russia in the Security Council, and 
its concerns over regime change in the light of the Libyan intervention, have 
prompted it to provide strong support for the Russian position on Syria. The more 
flexible stances taken by the IBSA states, on the other hand, can be partly 
attributed to the fact that there is less at stake for them if the Assad regime were to 
fall.  
  
Another important factor has been the differing internal governance structures of 
the BRICS. The democratic nature of the IBSA states is relevant in two respects: 
first, it has produced a degree of sympathy for the human rights of pro-democracy 
protesters throughout the Arab Spring, and second, as the Syrian crisis has 
worsened domestic media and civil society pressure for international action has 
had an impact on IBSA positions towards Syria.91 These influences are absent, or 
at least significantly weaker, within the non-democratic Russian and Chinese 
systems.  
 
A third significant factor contributing to the gradual softening of the IBSA states’ 
positions relates to their positions as reformist powers. India, Brazil and South 
Africa are all seeking to gain permanent seats in an expanded Security Council 
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and are conscious of the need to establish their credentials as good international 
citizens with the capacity to assume greater roles in international affairs.92 
Attempts to gain Western support for IBSA’s vision of UN reform could be 
undermined if the three states were to adopt obstructionist stances towards civilian 
protection. Russia and China, on the other hand, already occupy permanent seats 
on the Security Council and therefore, maintaining strong opposition to Western 
positions does not carry the same costs. In fact, resisting the West over Syria may 
benefit Russia and China in terms of increased domestic support and national 
pride.93 Overall, these three factors help to explain why the IBSA states have 
gradually moved away from the Russian and Chinese position on the Syrian issue.  
  
Despite their more accommodating stances towards international intervention in 
Syria the IBSA states, like Russia and China, remain concerned about the 
implementation of R2P’s third pillar. In an attempt to move the R2P debate 
forward Brazil released a paper called ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ (RwP) in 
November 2011.94 This document contained two main features. First, it outlined 
several criteria for the Security Council to consider when deliberating over the use 
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of force for civilian protection purposes. These included principles of force as a 
last resort only, proportionality and likelihood of success. The second significant 
feature was a call for the Security Council to establish monitoring and compliance 
mechanisms for assessing the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and 
implemented. This was a direct response to concerns over the way NATO 
interpreted resolution 1973 in Libya. 
 
Overall, RwP can be seen as an attempt to build a bridge between the West and 
R2P rejectionists like Russia and China.95 As a concept RwP is intended to 
complement, rather than replace, R2P. It offers an opportunity for Brazil to assert 
its credentials as an increasingly important international player by taking a leading 
role in the next stage of R2P’s normative development. Although initial reactions 
to RwP from the West and Russia and China were largely dismissive, the concept 
was given considerable attention by the UN Secretary General in his September 
2012 report on R2P96and may provide a useful starting point for future discussions 
about R2P.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The BRICS’ positions towards the implementation of R2P in Libya and Syria 
offer important insights into the future of intervention for civilian protection 
purposes in a multi-polar, post-Western world. All five BRICS expressed similar 
concerns over NATO’s military campaign in Libya, leading to a backlash against 
R2P which has paralysed the Security Council over Syria. Although initial signs 
were that the BRICS would form a unified bloc in opposition to the West, as the 
situation in Syria worsened the IBSA members gradually shifted away from 
Russia and China to adopt softer, more flexible stances to proposed international 
action. For IBSA, the Libyan and Syrian crises highlight a common dilemma 
faced by emerging powers: ‘the clash between regional norms [such as non-
intervention and non-use of force] that have until recently been adequate to the 
country’s previous focus, and the attitudes inherent to a position of great influence 
at the international level’.97 IBSA’s shifting stance on Syria indicates that these 
states are gradually adapting their traditional foreign policy stances to reflect the 
responsibilities and ambitions of future great powers, though they retain concerns 
about R2P’s third pillar. The positions of Russia and China, on the other hand, 
appear to have hardened as a result of the Libyan experience with R2P. 
 
For the future of R2P’s third pillar the crucial question is whether the political, 
conceptual, and operational challenges that have arisen in the aftermath of the 
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Libyan and Syrian crises can be resolved. While the current situation suggests that 
tensions between Western powers and Russia and China over R2P are unlikely to 
disappear quickly, the principle has survived previous periods of strong 
opposition during its short history, and may do so again. Although Brazil’s 
‘Responsibility While Protecting’ initiative offers some hope for bridging the gap 
between the two camps, in the short term at least attempts in the Security Council 
to operationalize R2P’s third pillar are likely to encounter significant resistance 
from Moscow and Beijing.  
 
